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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

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October 30, 1962

TO : S/P - Mr. Rostow
FROM : S/P - Ernest K. Lindley *EKL*
SUBJECT : Capitalizing on Soviet and Cuban Duplicity

I. Summary

The Cuban crisis has provided conspicuous and easily understood evidence of duplicity by the Soviet Government.

This evidence not only demonstrates the general thesis that Soviet words cannot be trusted but, in combination with the speed of the clandestine missile and bomber build-up in Cuba, underlines heavily the necessity for reliable inspection in agreements on arms limitations and related matters.

We should make systematic efforts to insure that the facts and significance of Soviet duplicity in regard to Soviet bases in Cuba are understood throughout the world and not allowed to be forgotten. Properly exploited, this example of double-dealing should be convertible into an important long-term handicap to Soviet propaganda and diplomacy, and particularly to Soviet disarmament and test-ban proposals. Indeed, it should prove the utter folly of agreements to reduce armaments without full verification of arms retained at every stage.

Likewise, false statements by the Castro regime about the arms build-up in Cuba should be exploited.

II. The Evidence of Duplicity

A. Two main pieces of evidence were quoted by the President in his address to the nation on October 22:

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1. The TASS statement of September 11:

"The Soviet government has also authorized TASS to state that there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country -- like Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force, and the Soviet Union has such powerful rockets to carry these warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union."

2. Gromyko's assurances during his talk with the President on October 18:

"The Soviet Union has responded to appeals for assistance only because that assistance pursued the sole objective of giving bread to Cuba and preventing hunger in that country; also, as far as armaments were concerned, Soviet specialists were training Cubans in handling certain types of armaments which were only defensive -- and I wish to stress the word defensive -- in character and thus such training would not constitute a threat to the US." •

Neither of these statements specifically denied that the Soviets were placing MRBMs and IRBMs and medium range bombers in Cuba. Thus, although misleading, they perhaps fall a little short of flagrant falsification.

B. The U. S. Government has further evidence, which it

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has not yet published:

1. At his background conference at 2:00 p.m., October 25, Secretary Rusk said:

"....the President was exactly accurate in saying that these weapons were secretly introduced contrary to the most explicit assurances.

"And I want to point out, lest you be diverted by semantics, that this was not just on the argument about whether weapons are defensive or offensive depending upon what is in the minds of the people who possess them. These were explicit assurances on the types and range of weapons, not just a matter of whether my weapons are defensive and yours are offensive."

2. The Secretary has said elsewhere, although not for quotation, that we received explicit assurances through official Soviet channels that the weapons being placed in Cuba did not have sufficient range to reach the United States.

3. Such evidence, if published in detail, obviously would help to rivet the proof of Soviet duplicity--although other considerations may continue to recommend against such publication.

C. Even without published proof of these more explicit assurances as to the types and ranges of Soviet weapons in Cuba, considerable additional evidence of Soviet duplicity is available. This includes Soviet allegations that U.S. photographs of missile installations in Cuba were "faked." Apparently the Soviet public understood these assurances very much as we did. And there is some evidence that even the Polish government was similarly misled.

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D. The Castro regime evidently misled even so good a friend as Ben Bella as to the nature of the military build-up in Cuba. A thorough canvass probably would turn up considerable evidence of Cuban duplicity in this affair.

III. The Potential Value of the Evidence

Soviet duplicity is an old story to us. But often it has been obscured not only by propaganda but by the complexities of the situations in which the double-dealing occurred. This was generally so in the Soviets' violations of their Yalta pledges as to Poland and the rest of eastern Europe. Moreover, during this period, most of the rest of the world was paying little attention to events in eastern Europe. And--not least--there is a widespread tendency, visible even in the West, to credit Khrushchev with a higher standard of international integrity than Stalin had.

Their duplicity in regard to the arms build-up in Cuba occurred while the whole world was watching. It involved a critically dangerous situation. More specifically, it involved nuclear arms. Altogether this probably has been the most striking example of Soviet duplicity since Khrushchev began "calling the shots" for the Soviet Union.

Neither a sense of relief because Khrushchev was "wise" enough to back down in the Cuban crisis nor hopes for negotiations involving other matters should deter us from exploiting intensively and extensively this prime example of Soviet duplicity. Nor should we be deterred by bromidic entreaties from more or less neutralist sources to help to create an atmosphere of "confidence." Such entreaties stem from basic misunderstandings of the nature and purposes of Communism, including the fact that deceit and trickery were

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approved--one might even say extolled--by Lenin, and thus must be assumed to be part of the working kit of every true Leninist such as Khrushchev.

In regard to any agreement regarding atomic tests, arms limitations and reductions, etc., it should now be possible to squelch by derision all proposals which depend on trusting the Soviet Union.

IV. Suggested Steps

Lord Hume, in his address of October 23, and Prime Minister Macmillan, in his statement to the House of Commons on October 25, zeroed in on this central matter of duplicity. The latter said: "...Nevertheless, I think what has happened in the last few weeks must confirm our view that in these grave matters we cannot rest upon mere words and promises. These need, if they are to restore confidence, to be independently verified and confirmed."

Secretary Rusk also has struck this theme in two or three of his background news conferences since the Cuban crisis developed.

These and other beginnings, such as Ambassador Stevenson's confrontation with Zorin in the U. N. Security Council, should be expanded into a systematic and continuing effort to drive home, especially in the minds of the naive or confused neutralists, the facts and significance of the duplicity practiced by the Soviet Government and its pawn, Castro. Evidence of previous duplicity by both should be supplied in judicious quantity--up to the capacity of the individual pupil to absorb it.

Detailed attention should be given by ACDA to the

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lessons of the Cuban crisis as applied to arms limitation. An energetic educative effort based on this experience should go a long way toward freeing us from neutralist pressures at Geneva and elsewhere to accept less than safe quantities and types of inspection. In this connection, one would suppose that ACDA would wish to review its own positions, to make sure that none of these has been influenced by Soviet obduracy or neutralist pressures.

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